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Abstract. The emerging technologies for large scale data analysis raise
new challenges to the security and privacy of sensitive user data. In
this work we investigate the problem of private statistical analysis of
time-series data in the distributed and semi-honest setting. In particu-
lar, we study some properties of Private Stream Aggregation (PSA), first
introduced by Shi et al. 2011. This is a computationally secure proto-
col for the collection and aggregation of data in a distributed network
and has a very small communication cost. In the non-adaptive query
model, a secure PSA scheme can be built upon any key-homomorphic
weak pseudo-random function as shown by Valovich 2017, yielding se-
curity guarantees in the standard model which is in contrast to Shi et.
al. We show that every mechanism which preserves pǫ, δq-differential pri-
vacy in effect preserves computational pǫ, δq-differential privacy when it
is executed through a secure PSA scheme. Furthermore, we introduce a
novel perturbation mechanism based on the symmetric Skellam distribu-
tion that is suited for preserving differential privacy in the distributed
setting, and find that its performances in terms of privacy and accuracy
are comparable to those of previous solutions. On the other hand, we
leverage its specific properties to construct a computationally efficient
prospective post-quantum protocol for differentially private time-series
data analysis in the distributed model. The security of this protocol is
based on the hardness of a new variant of the Decisional Learning with
Errors (DLWE) problem. In this variant the errors are taken from the
symmetric Skellam distribution. We show that this new variant is hard
based on the hardness of the standard Learning with Errors (LWE) prob-
lem where the errors are taken from the discrete Gaussian distribution.
Thus, we provide a variant of the LWE problem that is hard based on
conjecturally hard lattice problems and uses a discrete error distribution
that is similar to the continuous Gaussian distribution in that it is closed
under convolution. A consequent feature of the constructed prospective
post-quantum protocol is the use of the same noise for security and for
differential privacy.
‹ This is the full version of [38]. The research was supported by the DFG Research
Training Group GRK 1817{1
1 Introduction
Among several challenges that the society is facing in the era of big data, the
problem of data processing under strong privacy and security guarantees receives
a lot of attention in research communities. The framework of statistical disclo-
sure control aims at providing strong privacy guarantees for the records stored
in a database while enabling accurate statistical analyses to be performed. In re-
cent years, differential privacy has become one of the most important paradigms
for privacy-preserving statistical analyses. According to K. Nissim, a pioneer in
this area of research, ”there is a great promise for the marriage of Big Data and
Differential Privacy”.1 It combines mathematically rigorous privacy guarantees
with highly accurate analyses over larger data sets. Generally, the notion of dif-
ferential privacy is considered in the centralised setting where we assume the
existence of a trusted curator (see Blum et al. [8], Dwork [15], Dwork et al. [17],
McSherry and Talwar [25]) who collects data in the clear, aggregates and per-
turbs it properly (e.g. by adding Laplace noise) and publishes it. In this way, the
output statistics are not significantly influenced by the presence (resp. absence)
of a particular record in the database.
In this work we study how to preserve differential privacy when we cannot rely
on a trusted curator. In this so-called distributed setting, the users have to send
their own data to an untrusted aggregator. Preserving differential privacy and
achieving high accuracy in the distributed setting is of course harder than in the
centralised setting, since the users have to execute a perturbation mechanism
on their own. In order to achieve the same accuracy as provided by well-known
techniques in the centralised setting, Shi et al. [33] introduce the Private Stream
Aggregation (PSA) scheme, a cryptographic protocol enabling each user to se-
curely send encrypted time-series data to an aggregator. The aggregator is then
able to decrypt the aggregate of all data in each time-step, but cannot retrieve
any further information about the individual data. Using such a protocol, the
task of perturbation can be split among the users, such that computational dif-
ferential privacy, a notion first introduced by Mironov et al. [28], is preserved
and high accuracy is guaranteed. For a survey of applications of this protocol,
we refer to [33].
Related Work. In [33], a PSA scheme for sum queries was provided that sat-
isfies strong security guarantees under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) as-
sumption. However, this instantiation has some limitations. First, the security
only holds in the random oracle model; second, its decryption algorithm requires
the solution of the discrete logarithm in a given range, which can be very time-
consuming if the number of users and the plaintext space are large. Third, a
connection between the security of a PSA scheme and computational differential
privacy is not explicitly shown. In a subsequent work by Chan et al. [11], this con-
nection is still not completely established, since the polynomial-time reduction
between an attacker against a secure PSA scheme and a database distinguisher
is missing.
1 http://bigdata.csail.mit.edu/Big_Data_Privacy
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By lowering the requirements of Aggregator Obliviousness introduced in [33]
by abrogating the attacker’s possibility to adaptively compromise users during
the execution of a PSA scheme with time-series data, Valovich [37] shows that
a PSA scheme achieving this lower security level can be built upon any key-
homomorphic weak pseudo-random function. Since weak pseudo-randomness can
be achieved in the standard model, this condition also enables secure schemes
in the standard model. Furthermore, an instantiation of this result based on the
DDH assumption was given in [37], where decryption is always efficient. Joye
and Libert [22] provide a protocol with the same security guarantees in the ran-
dom oracle model as in [33]. The security of their scheme relies on the Decisional
Composite Residuosity assumption (rather than DDH as in [33]) and as a re-
sult, in the security reduction they can remove a factor which is cubic in the
number of users. However, their scheme involves a semi-trusted party for setting
some public parameters. In this work, we provide an instantiation of the generic
PSA construction from [37] which relies on the Decisional Learning with Errors
(DLWE) assumption. While in this generic security reduction a linear factor in
the number of users cannot be avoided, our construction does not involve any
trusted party and has security guarantees in the standard model. In a subsequent
work [7], a generalisation of the scheme from [22] is obtained based on smooth
projective hash functions (see [12]). This generalisation allows the construction
of secure protocols based on various hardness assumptions. However, the depen-
dencies on a semi-trusted party (for most of the instantiations) and on a random
oracle remain.
Contributions. In this regard, our results are as follows. First, reduction-based
security proofs for cryptographic schemes usually require an attacker in the
corresponding security game to send two different plaintexts (or plaintext col-
lections) to a challenger. The adversary receives then back a ciphertext which
is the encryption of one of these collections and has to guess which one it is.
In any security definition for a PSA scheme, these collections must satisfy a
particular requirement, i.e. they must lead to the same aggregate, since the at-
tacker has the capability to decrypt the aggregate (different aggregates would
make the adversary’s task trivial). In general, however, this requirement cannot
be satisfied in the context of differential privacy. Introducing a novel kind of
security reduction which deploys a biased coin flip, we show that, whenever a
randomised perturbation procedure is involved in a PSA scheme, the require-
ment of having collections with equal aggregate can be abolished. This result
can be generalised to any cryptographic scheme with such a requirement. Using
this property, we are able to show that if a mechanism preserves differential
privacy, then it preserves computational differential privacy when it is used as a
randomised perturbation procedure in a PSA scheme. This provides the missing
step in the analysis from [33].
Second, we introduce the Skellam mechanism that uses the symmetric Skel-
lam distribution and compare it with the geometric mechanism by Ghosh et al.
[18] and the binomial mechanism by Dwork et al. [16]. All three mechanisms
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preserve differential privacy and make use of discrete probability distributions.
Therefore, they are well-suited for an execution through a PSA scheme. For gen-
erating the right amount of noise among all users, these mechanisms apply two
different approaches. While in the geometric mechanism, with high probability,
only one user generates the noise necessary for differential privacy, the binomial
and Skellam mechanisms allow all users to generate noise of small variance, that
sums up to the required value for privacy by the reproducibility property of
the binomial and the Skellam distributions. We show that the theoretical error
bound of the Skellam mechanism is comparable to the other two. At the same
time, we provide experimental results showing that the geometric and Skellam
mechanisms have a comparable accuracy in practice, while beating the one of the
binomial mechanism. The advantage of the Skellam mechanism is that, based
on the previously mentioned results, it can be used it to construct the first se-
cure, prospective post-quantum PSA scheme for sum queries that automatically
preserves computational differential privacy. The corresponding weak pseudo-
random function for this protocol is constructed from the Learning with Errors
(LWE) problem that received a lot of attention in the cryptographic research
community in recent years. As an instance of the LWE problem we are given a
uniformly distributed matrix A P Zλˆκq and a noisy codeword y “ Ax` e P Zλq
with an error term e P Zλq chosen from a proper error distribution χλ and an un-
known x P Zκq . The task is to find the correct vector x. In the decisional version
of this problem (DLWE problem) we are given pA,yq and have to decide whether
y “ Ax` e or y is a uniformly distributed vector in Zλq . Regev [32] provided a
search-to-decision reduction to show that the two problems are essentially equiv-
alent in the worst case and Micciancio and Mol [27] provided a sample preserving
search-to-decision reduction for certain cases showing the equivalence in the av-
erage case. Moreover, in [32] the average-case-hardness of the search problem was
established by the construction of an efficient quantum algorithm for worst-case
lattice problems using an efficient solver of the LWE problem if the error dis-
tribution χ is a discrete Gaussian distribution. Accordingly, most cryptographic
applications of the LWE problem used a discrete Gaussian error distribution for
their constructions. We will take advantage of the reproducibility of the Skel-
lam distribution for our DLWE-based PSA scheme by using errors following the
symmetric Skellam distribution rather than the discrete Gaussian distribution,
which is not reproducible. The result is that the sum of the errors generated by
every user to secure their data is also a Skellam variable and therefore sufficient
for preserving differential privacy. Hence, we show the average-case-hardness of
the LWE problem with errors drawn from the Skellam distribution. Our proof is
inspired by techniques used by Do¨ttling and Mu¨ller-Quade [14] where a variant
of the LWE problem with uniform errors on a small support is shown to be
hard.2 Consequently, we obtain a lattice-based secure PSA scheme for analysing
2 Although the uniform distribution is reproducible as well, the result from [14] does
not provide a proper error distribution for our DLWE-based PSA scheme, since a dif-
ferentially private mechanism with uniform noise provides no accuracy to statistical
data analyses.
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sum queries under differential privacy where the noise is used both for security
and for preserving differential privacy at once.
Other Related Work. Another series of works deals with a distributed gener-
ation of noise for preserving differential privacy. Dwork et al. [16] consider the
Gaussian distribution for splitting the task of noise generation among all users.
Their proposed scheme requires more interactions between the users than our
solution. A´cs and Castelluccia [2] apply privacy-preserving data aggregation to
smart metering. The generation of Laplace noise is performed in a distributed
manner, since each meter simply generates the difference of two Gamma dis-
tributed random variables as a share of a Laplace distributed random variable.
In the work [31] each user generates a share of Laplace noise by generating a
vector of four Gaussian random variables. For a survey of the mechanisms given
in [31] and [2], we refer to [20]. However, the aforementioned mechanisms gen-
erate noise drawn according to continuous distributions, but for the use in a
PSA scheme discrete noise is required. Therefore, we consider proper discrete
distributions and compare their performances in private statistical analyses.
2 Preliminaries
Notation 1 For a natural number n, we denote by rns the interval t1, . . . , nu.
Notation 2 Let X be a set. If X is finite, we denote by UpXq the uniform
distribution on X. Let χ be a distribution on X. We denote by x Ð χ (or
sometimes x Ð χpXq) the sampling of x from X according to χ. If X has
only two elements, we write x ÐR X instead of x Ð UpXq. If A Ð χaˆb (or
A Ð χpXaˆbq) then A is an a ˆ b-matrix constructed by picking every entry
independently from X according to the distribution χ.
Notation 3 Let κ be a security parameter. If ω “ ωpκq ă 1{polypκq for every
polynomial poly and all κ ą κ1, for some κ1 P N, then we say that ω is negligible in
κ and denote it by ω “ negpκq. If ω is non-negligible in κ (i.e. if ω ą 1{polypκq),
then we write ω ą negpκq.
Notation 4 Let q ą 2 be a prime. We handle elements from Zq as their central
residue-class representation. This means that x1 P Zq is identified with x ”
x1 mod q for x P t´pq ´ 1q{2, . . . , pq ´ 1q{2u thereby lifting x1 from Zq to Z.
2.1 Problem statement
In this work we consider a distributed and semi-honest setting where n users
are asked to participate in some statistical analyses but do not trust the data
analyst (or aggregator), who is assumed to be honest but curious. Therefore, the
users cannot provide their own data in the clear. Moreover, they communicate
solely and independently with the untrusted aggregator, who wants to analyse
the users data by means of time-series queries and aims at obtaining answers
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as accurate as possible. More specifically, assume that the data items belong to
a data universe D. For a sequence of time-steps t P T , where T is a discrete
time period, the analyst sends queries which are answered by the users in a dis-
tributed manner. Each query is modelled as a function f : Dn Ñ O for a finite
or countably infinite set of possible outputs (i.e. answers to the query) O.
We also assume that some users may act in order to compromise the privacy
of the other participants. More precisely, we assume the existence of a publicly
known constant γ P p0, 1s which is the a priori estimate of the lower bound on
the fraction of uncompromised users who honestly follow the protocol and want
to release useful information about their data (with respect to a particular query
f), while preserving pǫ, δq-differential privacy. The remaining p1´ γq-fraction of
users is assumed to be compromised and following the protocol but aiming at
violating the privacy of uncompromised users. For that purpose, these users form
a coalition with the analyst and send her auxiliary information, e.g. their own
data in the clear.
For computing the answers to the aggregator’s queries, a special cryptographic
protocol, called Private Stream Aggregation (PSA) scheme, is used by all users.
In contrast to common secure multi-party techniques (see [19], [24]), this protocol
requires each user to send only one message per query to the analyst. In con-
nection with a differentially private mechanism, a PSA scheme assures that the
analyst is only able to learn a noisy aggregate of users’ data (as close as possible
to the real answer) and nothing else. Specifically, for preserving pǫ, δq-differential
privacy, it would be sufficient to add a single copy of (properly distributed)
noise Y to the aggregated statistics. Since we cannot add such noise once the
aggregate has been computed, the users have to generate and add noise to their
original data in such a way that the sum of the errors has the same distribution
as Y . For this purpose, we see two different approaches. In the first one, with
small probability a user adds noise sufficient to preserve the privacy of the entire
statistics. This probability is calibrated in such a way only one of the n users
is actually expected to add noise at all. Shi et al. [33] investigate this method
using the geometric mechanism from. [18]. In the second approach, each user
generates noise of small variance, such that the sum of all noisy terms suffices
to preserve differential privacy of the aggregate. To achieve this goal, we need a
discrete probability distribution which is closed under convolution and is known
to provide differential privacy. The binomial mechanism from [16] and the Skel-
lam mechanism introduced in this work serve these purposes.3
Since the protocol used for the data transmission is computationally secure, the
entire mechanism preserves a computational version of differential privacy as it
will be shown in Section 4.
2.2 Definitions
Differential Privacy. We consider a database as an element D P Dn with
data universe D and number of users n. Since D may contain sensitive infor-
3 Due to the use of a cryptographic protocol, the plaintexts have to be discrete. This
is the reason why we use discrete distributions for generating noise.
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mation, the users want to protect their privacy. Therefore, a privacy-preserving
mechanism must be applied. We will always assume that a mechanism is ap-
plied in the distributed setting. Differential privacy is a well-established notion
for privacy-preserving statistical analyses. We recall that a randomised mecha-
nism preserves differential privacy if its application on two adjacent databases
(databases differing in one entry only) leads to close distributions of the outputs.
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy [17]) Let R be a (possibly infinite) set
and let n P N. A randomised mechanism A : Dn Ñ R preserves pǫ, δq-differential
privacy (short: DP), if for all adjacent databases D0, D1 P Dn and all measurable
R Ď R:
PrrApD0q P Rs ď eǫ ¨ PrrApD1q P Rs ` δ.
The probability space is defined over the randomness of A.
The additional parameter δ is necessary for mechanisms which cannot pre-
serve ǫ-DP (i.e. pǫ, 0q-DP) for certain cases. However, if the probability that these
cases occur is bounded by δ, then the mechanism preserves pǫ, δq-DP.
In the literature, there are well-established mechanisms for preserving differ-
ential privacy, e.g. the Laplace mechanism from [17] and the Exponential mech-
anism from [25]. In order to privately evaluate a query, these mechanisms draw
error terms according to some distribution depending on the query’s global sen-
sitivity.
Definition 2 (Global Sensitivity) The global sensitivity Spfq of a query f :
Dn Ñ Rk is defined as
Spfq “ max
D0,D1 adjacent
||fpD0q ´ fpD1q||1.
In particular, we will consider sum queries fD : D
n Ñ Z defined as fDpDq :“řn
i“1 di, for D “ pd1, . . . , dnq P Dn and D Ď Z.
For measuring how well the output of a mechanism estimates the real data with
respect to a particular query, we use the notion of pα, βq-accuracy.
Definition 3 (Accuracy) The output of a mechanism A achieves pα, βq-accuracy
for a query f : Dn Ñ R if for all D P Dn:
Prr|ApDq ´ fpDq| ď αs ě 1´ β.
The probability space is defined over the randomness of A.
The use of a cryptographic protocol for transferring data provides a compu-
tational security level. If such a protocol is applied to preserve DP, this implies
that only a computational level of DP can be provided. The definition of compu-
tational differential privacy was first provided in [28] and subsequently extended
in [11].
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Definition 4 (Computational Differential Privacy [11]) Let κ be a secu-
rity parameter and n P N with n “ polypκq. A randomised mechanism A : Dn Ñ
R preserves computational pǫ, δq-differential privacy (short: CDP), if for all ad-
jacent databases D0, D1 P Dn and all probabilistic polynomial-time distinguishers
DCDP:
PrrDCDPp1κ,ApD0qq “ 1s ď eǫ ¨ PrrDCDPp1κ,ApD1qq “ 1s ` δ ` negpκq,
where negpκq is a negligible function in κ. The probability space is defined over
the randomness of A and DCDP.
The notion of CDP is a natural computational indistinguishability-extension
of the information-theoretical definition. The advantage is that preserving dif-
ferential privacy only against bounded attackers helps to substantially reduce
the error of the answer provided by the mechanism.
Private Stream Aggregation. We define the Private Stream Aggregation
scheme and give a security definition for it. Thereby, we mostly follow the con-
cepts introduced in [33], though we deviate in a few points. A PSA scheme is a
protocol for safe distributed time-series data transfer which enables the receiver
(here: the untrusted analyst) to learn nothing else than the sums
řn
i“1 xi,j for
j “ 1, 2, . . ., where xi,j is the value of the ith participant in time-step j and n
is the number of participants (or users). Such a scheme needs a key exchange
protocol for all n users together with the analyst as a precomputation (e.g. using
multi-party techniques), and requires each user to send exactly one message in
each time-step j “ 1, 2, . . ..
Definition 5 (Private Stream Aggregation [33]) Let κ be a security pa-
rameter, D a set and n “ polypκq, λ “ polypκq. A Private Stream Aggregation
(PSA) scheme Σ “ pSetup,PSAEnc,PSADecq is defined by three ppt algorithms:
Setup: ppp, T, s0, s1, . . . , snq Ð Setupp1κq with public parameters pp,
T “ tt1, . . . , tλu and secret keys si for all i “ 1, . . . , n.
PSAEnc: For tj P T and all i “ 1, . . . , n: ci,j Ð PSAEncsiptj , xi,jq for xi,j P D.
PSADec: Compute
řn
i“1 x
1
i,j “ PSADecs0ptj , c1,j , . . . , cn,jq for tj P T and ci-
phers c1,j , . . . , cn,j. For all tj P T and x1,j , . . . , xn,j P D the following holds:
PSADecs0ptj ,PSAEncs1ptj , x1,jq, . . . ,PSAEncsnptj , xn,jqq “
nÿ
i“1
xi,j .
The Setup-phase has to be carried out just once and for all, and can be per-
formed with a secure multi-party protocol among all users and the analyst. In
all other phases, no communication between the users is needed.
The system parameters pp are public and constant for all time-steps with the
implicit understanding that they are used in Σ. Every user encrypts her value
xi,j with her own secret key si and sends the ciphertext to the analyst. If the
analyst receives the ciphertexts of all users in a time-step tj , it computes the
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aggregate with the decryption key s0.
For a particular time-step, let the users’ values be of the form xi,j “ di,j ` ei,j ,
i “ 1, . . . , n, where di,j P D is the original data of the user i and ei,j is her
error term.4 It is reasonable to assume that ei,j “ 0 for the p1´ γq ¨ n compro-
mised users, since this can only increase their chances to infer some information
about the uncompromised users. There is no privacy-breach if only one user
adds the entirely needed noise (first approach) or if the uncompromised users
generate noise of low variance (second approach), since the single values xi,j are
encrypted and the analyst cannot learn anything about them, except for their
aggregate.
Security. Since our model allows the analyst to compromise users, the aggrega-
tor can obtain auxiliary information about the data of the compromised users
or their secret keys. Even then a secure PSA scheme should release no more
information than the aggregate of the uncompromised users’ data.
Informally, a PSA scheme Σ is secure if every probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithm, with knowledge of the analyst’s and compromised users’ keys and
with adaptive encryption queries, has only negligible advantage in distinguish-
ing between the encryptions of two databases pD0, pD1 of its choice with equal
aggregates. We can assume that an adversary knows the secret keys of the entire
compromised coalition. If the protocol is secure against such an attacker, then
it is also secure against an attacker without the knowledge of every key from
the coalition. Thus, in our security definition we consider the most powerful
adversary.
Definition 6 (Non-adaptive Aggregator Obliviousness [37]) Let κ be a
security parameter. Let T be a ppt adversary for a PSA scheme
Σ “ pSetup,PSAEnc,PSADecq and let D be a set. We define a security game
between a challenger and the adversary T .
Setup. The challenger runs the Setup algorithm on input security parameter
κ and returns public parameters pp, public encryption parameters T with
|T | “ λ “ polypκq and secret keys s0, s1, . . . , sn. It sends κ, pp, T, s0 to T . T
chooses U Ď rns and sends it to the challenger which returns psiqiPrnszU .
Queries. T is allowed to query pi, tj , xi,jq with i P U, tj P T, xi,j P D and the
challenger returns ci,j Ð PSAEncsiptj , xi,jq.
Challenge. T chooses tj˚ P T such that no encryption query with tj˚ was
made. (If there is no such tj˚ then the challenger simply aborts.) T queries
two different tuples pxr0s
i,j˚
qiPU , pxr1si,j˚qiPU with
ř
iPU x
r0s
i,j˚
“ řiPU xr1si,j˚ . The
challenger flips a random bit bÐR t0, 1u. For all i P U the challenger returns
ci,j˚ Ð PSAEncsiptj˚ , xrbsi,j˚q.
4 The perturbation of data is considered in the context of DP. Potentially, it yields
larger values xi,j due to the (possibly) infinite domain of the underlying probability
distribution. Depending on the variance, we therefore need to choose a sufficiently
large interval pD “ t´m, . . . ,mu as plaintext space, where m ą maxt|w|, |w1|u such
that |xi,j | ď m for all i “ 1, . . . , n with high probability.
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Queries. T is allowed to make the same type of queries as before restricted to
encryption queries with tj ‰ tj˚ .
Guess. T outputs a guess about b.
The adversary’s probability to win the game (i.e. to guess b correctly) is 1{2 `
νpκq. A PSA scheme is non-adaptively aggregator oblivious or achieves non-adaptive
Aggregator
Obliviousness (AO2), if there is no ppt adversary T with advantage νpκq ą
negpκq in winning the game.
Encryption queries are made only for i P U , since knowing the secret key
for all i P rnszU the adversary can encrypt a value autonomously. If encryption
queries in time-step t˚j were allowed, then no deterministic scheme would be
aggregator oblivious. The adversary T can determine the original data of all
i P rnszU for every time-step, since it knows psiqiPrnszU . Then T can compute
the aggregate of the uncompromised users’ data.
Definition 6 differs from the definition of Aggregator Obliviousness from [33] in
that we require the adversary to specify the set U of uncompromised users before
making any query, i.e. we do not allow the adversary to determine U adaptively.
In light of that and in analogy to the definitions of security against adaptive
(CCA1) and non-adaptive (CCA2) chosen ciphertext adversaries, we refer to the
security definition from [33] as AO1 and to our security definition as AO2. In
this work we simply call a PSA scheme secure if it achieves AO2.
Weak PRF. In the analysis of the secure protocol, we make use of the following
definition.
Definition 7 (Weak PRF [29]) Let κ be a security parameter. Let A,B,C be
sets with sizes parameterised by a complexity parameter κ. A family of functions
F “ tFa |Fa : B Ñ CuaPA
is called a weak PRF family, if for all ppt algorithms D
Op¨q
PRF
with oracle access to
Op¨q (where Op¨q P tFap¨q, randp¨qu) on any polynomial number of given uniformly
chosen inputs, we have:
|PrrDFap¨q
PRF
pκq “ 1s ´ PrrDrandp¨q
PRF
pκq “ 1s| ď negpκq,
where aÐ UpAq and rand P tf | f : B Ñ Cu is a random mapping from B to C.
3 Main Result
In this work we prove the following result by showing the connection between
a key-homomorphic weak pseudo-random function and a differentially private
mechanism for sum queries.
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Theorem 1 Let ǫ ą 0, w ă w1 P Z, m,n P N with maxt|w|, |w1|u ă m. Let
D “ tw, . . . , w1u and fD be a sum query. If there exist groups G1 Ď G, a key-
homomorphic weak pseudo-random function family mapping into G1 and an effi-
ciently computable and efficiently invertible homomorphism ϕ : t´mn, . . . ,mnu Ñ
G injective over t´mn, . . . ,mnu, then there exists an efficient mechanism for fD
that preserves pǫ, δq-CDP for any 0 ă δ ă 1 with an error bound of OpSpfDq{ǫ ¨
logp1{δqq and requires each user to send exactly one message.
The proof of Theorem 1 is provided in the next two sections. In Section 4 we
recall from [37] how to construct a general PSA scheme from a key-homomorphic
weak PRF. Subsequently, we show that a secure PSA scheme in composition with
a DP-mechanism preserves CDP. In Section 5, based on the DLWE problem
with errors drawn from a Skellam distribution, we provide an instantiation of a
key-homomorphic weak PRF. This yields a concrete efficient PSA scheme that
automatically embeds a DP-mechanism with accuracy as stated in Theorem 1.
4 From Key-Homomorphic Weak PRF to CDP
We give a condition for the existence of secure PSA schemes and then analyse
its connection to CDP.
4.1 From Key-Homomorphic Weak PRF to secure PSA
Now we state the condition for the existence of secure PSA schemes for sum
queries in the sense of Definition 6.
Theorem 2 (Weak PRF gives secure PSA scheme [37]) Let κ be a secu-
rity parameter, andm,n P N with logpmq “ polypκq, n “ polypκq. Let pG, ¨q, pS, ˚q
be finite abelian groups and G1 Ď G. For some finite set M , let F “ tFs |Fs :
M Ñ G1usPS be a (possibly randomised) weak PRF family and let
ϕ : t´mn, . . . ,mnu Ñ G be a mapping. Then the following PSA scheme Σ “
pSetup,PSAEnc,PSADecq achieves AO2:
Setup: ppp, T, s0, s1, . . . , snq Ð Setupp1κq, where pp are parameters of G,G1, S,
M,F , ϕ. The keys are si Ð UpSq for all i P rns with s0 “ p˚ni“1 siq´1
and T Ă M such that all tj P T are chosen uniformly at random from M ,
j “ 1, . . . , λ “ polypκq.
PSAEnc: Compute ci,j “ Fsiptjq ¨ϕpxi,jq in G for xi,j P pD “ t´m, . . . ,mu and
public parameter tj P T .
PSADec: Compute Vj “ ϕ´1pSjq (if possible) with Sj “ Fs0ptjq ¨ c1,j ¨ . . . ¨ cn,j.
Moreover, if F contains only deterministic functions that are homomorphic over
S, if ϕ is homomorphic and injective over t´mn, . . . ,mnu and if the ci,j are
encryptions of the xi,j , then Vj “
řn
i“1 xi,j , i.e. then PSADec correctly decryptsřn
i“1 xi,j .
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The reason for not including the correctness property in the main statement
is that in Section 5 we will provide an example of a secure PSA scheme based on
the DLWE problem that does not have a fully correct decryption algorithm, but
a noisy one. This noise is necessary for establishing the security of the protocol
and will be also used for preserving the differential privacy of the decryption
output.
Hence, we need a key-homomorphic weak PRF and a mapping which homo-
morphically aggregates all users’ data. Since every data value is at most m, the
scheme correctly retrieves the aggregate, which is at most m ¨ n. Importantly,
the product of all pseudo-random values Fs0ptq,Fs1ptq, . . . ,Fsnptq is the neutral
element in the group G for all t P T . Since the values in T are uniformly dis-
tributed in M , it is enough to require that F is a weak PRF family. Thus, the
statement of Theorem 2 does not require a random oracle.
4.2 From secure PSA to CDP
In this section, we describe how to preserve CDP using a PSA scheme. Specifi-
cally, let A be a mechanism which, given some event Good, evaluates a statistical
query f : Dn Ñ O over a database D P Dn preserving ǫ-DP. Furthermore, let
Σ be a PSA scheme for f that achieves AO1 (or AO2). We show that the com-
position of A and Σ preserves ǫ-CDP given Good. Assume Prr Goods ď δ. We
show that A preserves pǫ, δq-CDP unconditionally, if executed through Σ. For
simplicity, in this section we focus on sum-queries, but our analysis can be easily
extended to more general statistical queries.
Since we are dealing with a computationally secure scheme, we need a polyno-
mial time reduction from an adversary on the security of the PSA scheme to a
CDP-distinguisher for databases. As a result, our scheme preserves pǫ, δq-CDP.
Since in the original security-game, the generation of noise is not considered and
the aggregates of the two challenge databases in the clear have to be equal with
respect to the query fD (rather than differ by SpfDq as in the definition of dif-
ferential privacy), we need to perform a certain kind of randomisation process
within the reduction. For this purpose, we introduce a novel kind of security
game which we call a biased security game. In contrast to a usual security game
as it is common in security proofs for cryptosystems, in a biased security game
the challenger is allowed to generate a biased coin in order to pick the data set
to send as challenge to the adversary.
Redefining the security of PSA Let us first modify the security game in
Definition 6 in the following way. Let game 1 be the original game from Defini-
tion 6. Let p P p0, 1q and P “ maxtp, 1´ pu. The game 1B5 for a ppt adversary
T1,B is defined as game 1 with the following changes:
– In the challenge phase, after choosing the two different challenge-collections,
T1,B computes p P p0, 1q and sends it to the challenger.
5 The subscript B stands for biased.
12
– In the challenge phase, the challenger chooses b “ 0 with probability p and
b “ 1 with probability 1´ p.
We call a PSA scheme biased-secure, if the probability of every ppt adversary
T1,B in winning the above game is P ` negpκq. Note that game 1 is a special
case of game 1B, where P “ 1{2. We refer to this case as the unbiased version
(rather the biased version if P ą 1{2) of game 1B. In the unbiased case, we
just drop the dependence on P and the adversary is not required to send p to
its challenger.
The reason for introducing game 1B is that in the context of differential pri-
vacy, it is very unlikely to have equal aggregates of the two plaintext collections
in the challenge phase of the original game, since the data is perturbed by a
differentially private mechanism. The use of a bias towards one of the collections
will balance the incorporation of noise as we will show below. First, we show
that a successful adversary in game 1B for any P P r1{2, 1q yields a successful
adversary in game 1.
Lemma 3 Let κ be a security parameter. For any p P p0, 1q, let T1,B be an
adversary in game 1B with advantage ν1,Bpκq ą negpκq. Then there exists an
adversary T1 in game 1 with advantage ν1pκq ą negpκq.
Proof. Given a successful adversary T1,B in game 1B, we construct a successful
adversary T1 in game 1 as follows:
Setup. Receive κ, pp, T, s0 from the game 1-challenger and send it to T1,B. Re-
ceive U Ď rns from T1,B and send it to the challenger. Forward the obtained
response psiqiPrnszU to T1,B .
Queries. Forward T1,B’s queries pi, j, xi,jq with i P U, j P rλs, xi,j P pD to the
challenger, forward the response ci,j to T1,B.
Challenge. T1,B chooses j
˚ P t1, . . . , λu such that no encryption query in
j˚ was made, sends p P p0, 1q and queries two different tuples pxr0s
i,j˚
qiPU ,
pxr1s
i,j˚
qiPU with
ř
iPU x
r0s
i,j˚
“ řiPU xr1si,j˚ . Choose a bit a with
Prra “ 0s “ p,Prra “ 1s “ 1 ´ p and query pxras
i,j˚
qiPU , pxi,j˚ qiPU to the
challenger, where xi,j˚ Ð Up pDq for all i P U and řiPU xi,j˚ “ řiPU xrasi,j˚ .
Obtain the response pci,j˚qiPU and forward it to T1,B.
Queries. T1,B can make the same type of queries as before with the restriction
that no encryption query in j˚ can be made.
Guess. T1,B gives a guess about a. If it is correct, output 0; else, output 1.
If T1,B has output the correct guess about a, then T1 can say with high confidence
that the challenge ciphertexts are the encryptions of pxras
i,j˚
qiPU and therefore
outputs 0. On the other hand, if T1,B’s guess was not correct, then T1 can say
with high confidence that the challenge ciphertexts are the encryptions of the
random collection pxi,j˚qiPU and it outputs 1. Formally:
13
Case 1. Let pci,j˚qiPU “ pPSAEncsiptj˚ , xrasi,j˚qqiPU . Then T1 perfectly simulates
game 1B for T1,B and the distribution of ciphers is the same as in game 1B:
PrrT1 winss
“PrrT1 outputs 0s
“p ¨ PrrT1,B outputs 0 | a “ 0s ` p1´ pq ¨ PrrT1,B outputs 1 | a “ 1s
“PrrT1,B wins P -game 1s
“P ` ν1,Bpκq.
Case 2. Let pci,j˚qiPU “ pPSAEncsiptj˚ , xi,j˚qqiPU . Then the ciphertexts are
random with the constraint that their product is the same as in the first case.
The probability that T1,B wins his modified game is at most P (by choosing the
Bayes-optimal hypthesis) and
PrrT1 winss
“PrrT1 outputs 1s
“ p ¨ PrrT1,B outputs 1 | a “ 0s ` p1´ pq ¨ PrrT1,B outputs 0 | a “ 1s ¨ p1´ pq
“PrrT1,B losess
ě 1´ P.
Finally, we obtain that the advantage of T1 in winning game 1 is
ν1pκq “ |PrrT1 outputs 1|pci,j˚qiPU “ pPSAEncsiptj˚ , xi,j˚qqiPU s
´ PrrT1 outputs 1|pci,j˚qiPU “ pPSAEncsiptj˚ , xrasi,j˚qqiPU s|
ě ν1,Bpκq
ą negpκq.
[\
Constructing a PSA adversary using a CDP adversary Security game
for adjacent databases. For showing that a biased-secure PSA scheme is suitable
for preserving CDP, we have to construct a successful adversary in game 1B
using a successful distinguisher for adjacent databases. We define the following
game 0 for a ppt adversary T0 which is identical to game 1 with a changed
challenge-phase:
Challenge. T0 chooses j
˚ P t1, . . . , λu with no encryption query made in j˚.
T0 queries two adjacent tuples pdr0si,j˚qiPU , pdr1si,j˚qiPU . The challenger flips a
random bit bÐR t0, 1u. For all i P U , the challenger returns
ci,j˚ “ PSAEncsiptj˚ , xrbsi,j˚q,
where x
rbs
i,j˚
P pD is a noisy version of drbs
i,j˚
P D for all i P U obtained by some
randomised perturbation process.
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Now consider the following experiment which we call Exp1. Let χ : pDn Ñ r0, 1s
be a probability mass function on pDn. For simplicity, we consider the case where
D Ď pD “ Z. Let D0 “ pdp0q1 , . . . , dp0qn q, D1 “ pdp1q1 , . . . , dp1qn q P Dn be adjacent,
i.e. differing in only one entry. Then Exp1 is performed as follows:
1. Let B1{2 be a Bernoulli variable with PrrB1{2 “ 0s “ 1{2. Choose a realisa-
tion b of B1{2.
2. Let X1 “ pX1, . . . , Xnq be a random vector with
PrrX1 “ xs “
#
χpx´D0q if b “ 0
χpx´D1q if b “ 1,
i.e. X1 “ DB1{2 ` E, where E “ pE1, . . . , Enq is a random variable with
PrrE “ es “ χpeq. Choose a realisation e “ pe1, . . . , enq of E and let x “
px1, . . . , xnq with xi “ dpbqi ` ei for all i “ 1, . . . , n be a realisation of X1.
3. Compute s “ řni“1 xi “ řni“1 dpbqi ` ei, which is a realisation of the random
variable S “ řni“1 Xi “ řni“1 dpB1{2qi ` Ei.
4. Output b,x, s.
We define an experiment Exp2.
1. Choose a realisation s of the random variable S as defined in Exp1, i.e.
choose a realisation b of B1{2, choose a realisation e “ pe1, . . . , enq of E “
pE1, . . . , Enq according to the probability mass function χ and set s “řn
i“1 d
pbq
i ` ei. Delete b and e.
2. Let p “ PrrB1{2 “ 0|S “ ss. Let Bp be a Bernoulli variable with
PrrBp “ 0s “ p. Choose a realisation b of Bp.
3. Choose a realisation x of the random vector X2 with conditional probability
PrrX1 “ x|B1{2 “ b, S “ ss
defined by the random variables from Exp
1
.
4. Output b,x, s.
First, we show the statistical equivalence of Exp1 and Exp2. Second, we show
that Exp2 is efficiently executable. For showing that Exp1 and Exp2 are statisti-
cally equivalent, it suffices to show that the joint distributions PrrB1{2,X1, Ss
and PrrBp,X2, Ss are equal.
Lemma 4 (Statistical equivalence of Exp
1
and Exp
2
) For the defined ex-
periments, we have PrrB1{2,X1, Ss “ PrrBp,X2, Ss.
Proof. It holds that
PrrBp,X2, Ss “ PrrBps ¨ PrrX2s ¨ PrrSs
“ PrrB1{2|Ss ¨ PrrX1|B1{2, Ss ¨ PrrSs
“ PrrB1{2,X1, Ss.
[\
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Note that Lemma 4 also holds for the marginals of pB1{2,X1, Sq and
pBp,X2, Sq.
For the next lemma, we define Epiq “ pEi, . . . , Enq for i “ 1, . . . , n, where for
i “ 1, . . . , n the random variable Ei is defined as in Exp1 (thus Ep1q “ E) and
for all i “ 1, . . . , n, let χpiq : pDn´i`1 Ñ r0, 1s be the according probability mass
function on Epiq. Furthermore, let Epiq “ řnj“i Ej for all i “ 1, . . . , n.
Lemma 5 Let κ be a complexity parameter. Assume the following holds for all
i “ 1 . . . , n:
1. Given y P Z, the probabilities PrrEi “ ys and PrrEpiq “ ys are efficiently
computable.
2. Either every quantile of Ei is efficiently computable or the number of possible
realisations of Epiq is bounded by t “ polypκq with probability 1´ negpκq.
If Experiment Exp1 terminates in time polynomial in κ, then with probability
1´ negpκq, Experiment Exp2 terminates in time polynomial in κ.
Proof. Since Exp1 terminates in polynomial time, Step 1 of Exp2 terminates in
polynomial time. Moreover, we have
p “PrrB1{2 “ 0|S “ ss
“PrrS “ s|B1{2 “ 0s ¨ PrrB1{2 “ 0s
PrrS “ ss
“ PrrS “ s|B1{2 “ 0s
PrrS “ s|B1{2 “ 0s ` PrrS “ s|B1{2 “ 1s
“ PrrE “ s´
řn
i“1 d
0
i s
PrrE “ s´řni“1 d0i s ` PrrE “ s´řni“1 d1i s
where E “ Ep1q “ řni“1 Ei. By the first assumption, all probabilities in the
fraction are efficiently computable, thus p is efficiently computable. Since Bp is
a Bernoulli variable, Step 2 of Exp2 terminates in polynomial time. We show
that Step 3 of Exp2 terminates in polynomial time with overwhelming prob-
ability. By definition, the random variable X2 is generated by generating X1
conditioned on B1{2 and S. Let y “ s´
řn
i“1 d
pbq
i , e “ pe1, . . . , enq “ x´Db and
epiq “ pei, . . . , enq for all i “ 1, . . . , n. Let 1pyq “ 1tzPZ|z“řn
i“1 eiupyq denote the
characteristic function of tz P Z|z “ řni“1 eiu, which is 1, if y “ řni“1 ei and 0
otherwise. Then we have
PrrX2 “ xs “ PrrX1 “ x|B1{2 “ b, S “ ss
“ Pr
«
E “ x´Db |E “ s´
nÿ
i“1
d
pbq
i
ff
“ PrrE “ e |E “ ys
“ PrrEp1q “ ep1q |Ep1q “ ys
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“ PrrE1 “ e1 |Ep1q “ ys ¨ PrrEp2q “ ep2q |E1 “ e1, Ep1q “ ys
“ PrrE1 “ e1 |Ep1q “ ys ¨ PrrEp2q “ ep2q |Ep2q “ y ´ e1s
“
˜
n´1ź
i“1
Pr
«
Ei “ ei |Epiq “ y ´
i´1ÿ
j“1
ej
ff¸
¨
¨ Pr
«
Epnq “ epnq |Epnq “ y ´
n´1ÿ
j“1
ej
ff
“
˜
n´1ź
i“1
Pr
«
Ei “ ei |Epiq “ y ´
i´1ÿ
j“1
ej
ff¸
¨ 1pyq. (1)
The second to last equality follows from expanding the recursion. Moreover, for
all i “ 1 . . . , n´ 1 we have
Pr
«
Ei “ ei |Epiq “ y ´
i´1ÿ
j“1
ej
ff
“ PrrE
piq “ y ´ři´1j“1 ej |Ei “ eis ¨ PrrEi “ eis
PrrEpiq “ y ´ři´1j“1 ejs
“ PrrE
pi`1q “ y ´řij“1 ejs ¨ PrrEi “ eis
PrrEpiq “ y ´ři´1j“1 ejs . (2)
Thus, we can implement Step 3 by the following procedure:
1. Sequentially, for all i “ 1, . . . , n ´ 1: choose a realisation ei of Ei given
Epiq “ y ´ři´1j“1 ej according to the distribution given by Equation 2.
2. Then the value En “ en is determined by Equation 1.
3. Output x “ pdpbq1 ` e1, . . . , dpbqn ` enq.
By the second assumption, the first step can be performed efficiently either by
inverse transform sampling as described in [13] or by considering pt`1q-quantiles.
[\
Note 1 The first assumption of Lemma 5 is always satisfied if the generation
of S given B1{2 is performed by an efficient mechanism that preserves ǫ´DP in
the distributed model, since every user has to perform a perturbation procedure
on her own. In that case, also the efficient performance of Exp1 is given. The
second assumption of Lemma 5 is true for all distributions that are used for the
mechanisms considered in this work.
We bound the probability p in Exp2 if the generation of S given B1{2 is
performed by a mechanism that preserves ǫ´ DP.
Lemma 6 Let B1{2 be a Bernoulli variable with PrrB1{2 “ 0s “ 1{2. Let A be
an ǫ ´ DP mechanism and let D0, D1 be adjacent databases. Let S “ ApDB1{2q
be a random variable. Then
1
1` eǫ ď PrrB1{2 “ 0|S “ ss ď
eǫ
1` eǫ .
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Proof. We bound the probability p “ PrrB1{2 “ 0|S “ ss for the biased coin in
Exp2. Since the generation of S was performed by A, we have
e´ǫ ¨ PrrS “ s|B1{2 “ 0s ď PrrS “ s|B1{2 “ 1s
ď eǫ ¨ PrrS “ s|B1{2 “ 0s.
By the Bayes rule we get
pmin :“ 1
1` eǫ ď p ď
eǫ
1` eǫ “: pmax.
[\
The Reduction. With Lemma 4 in mind, we can show that playing game 0 is
equivalent to playing game 1B .
Lemma 7 Let κ be a security parameter. Let T0 be an adversary in game 0. Let
B1{2 denote the random variable describing the challenge bit b in game 0 and let
S denote the random variable describing the aggregate of pxrB1{2s
i,j˚
qiPU . Let p be
the probability of B1{2 “ 0 given the choice of S and let P “ maxtp, 1´pu. Then
for a, b “ 0, 1, under the assumptions of Lemma 5, there exists an adversary T1,B
in game 1B with
PrrT1,B “ a,Bp “ bs “ PrrT0 “ a,B1{2 “ bs.6
Proof. We construct a successful adversary T1,B in game 1B using T0 as follows:
Setup. Receive κ, pp, T, s0 from the game 1B-challenger and send it to T0.
Receive U “ ti1, . . . , iuu Ď rns from T0 and send it to the challenger. Forward
the obtained response psiqiPrnszU to T0.
Queries. Forward T0’s queries pi, j, di,jq with i P U, j P rλs, di,j P D to the
challenger, forward the response ci,j to T0.
Challenge. T0 chooses j
˚ P t1, . . . , λu such that no encryption query in j˚
was made and queries two adjacent tuples pdr0s
i,j˚
qiPU , pdr1si,j˚qiPU . Choose a
realisation s of S according to Exp2. Set p “ PrrB1{2 “ 0|S “ ss and choose
pxr0s
i,j˚
qiPU , pxr1si,j˚qiPU with probability
PrrX2 “ pxr0si,j˚qiPU s,PrrX2 “ pxr1si,j˚qiPU s
respectively according to Exp2. Send p, j
˚, pxr0s
i,j˚
, x
r1s
i,j˚
qiPU to the challenger.
Obtain the response pci,j˚qiPU and forward it to T0.
Queries. T0 can make the same type of queries as before with the restriction
that no encryption query in j˚ can be made.
Guess. T0 gives a guess about the encrypted database. Output the same guess.
6 This also shows that T1,B has the same success probability as T0.
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The rules of game 1B are preserved, since T1,B sends two tuples of the same ag-
gregate s to its challenger. On the other hand, since the ciphertexts generated by
the challenger are determined by the challenge bit and the collection pxrbs
i,j˚
qiPU ,
the rules of game 0 are preserved by Lemma 4 (the triple pb, pxrbs
i,j˚
qiPU , sq is
chosen according to Exp2, which can be performed efficiently by Lemma 5).
Therefore T1,B perfectly simulates game 0. [\
Proof of CDP We have shown that no ppt adversary can win game 1B if the
underlying PSA scheme is secure and that game 1B is equivalent to game 0. If
the perturbation process in game 0 preserves ǫ-DP, then the whole construction
provides ǫ-CDP, as we show now.
Theorem 8 (DP and AO1 give CDP) Let A be a randomised mechanism that
gets as inpout some database D “ pd1, . . . , dnq P Dn, generates some database
X “ XpDq “ px1pd1q, . . . , xnpdnqq “ px1, . . . , xnq and outputs s “
řn
i“1 xi, such
that ǫ-DP for D is preserved. Let Σ be a PSA scheme that gets as input values
x1, . . . , xn, outputs ciphers c1 “ c1px1q, . . . , cn “ cnpxnq and s “
řn
i“1 xi and
achieves AO1. Then the composition of Σ with A achieves AO1 and preserves
ǫ-CDP.
Proof. Then for all ppt adversaries T1,B in game 1B and DCDP “ T0 in game 0,
it holds for a “ 0, 1:
PrrDCDP “ a,B1{2 “ 1s “ PrrT1,B “ a,Bp “ 1s (3)
ď pmax ¨ PrrT1,B “ a|Bp “ 1s
“ pmax ¨ PrrT1,B “ a|Bp “ 0s ` negpκq (4)
ď pmax
pmin
¨ PrrT1,B “ a,Bp “ 0s ` negpκq
“ eǫ ¨ PrrT1,B “ a,Bp “ 0s ` negpκq (5)
“ eǫ ¨ PrrDCDP “ a,B1{2 “ 0s ` negpκq. (6)
Equation (4) holds because of Lemma 3, Equation (5) holds because of Lemma
6 and Equations (3) and (6) hold because of Lemma 7. It follows that
PrrDCDP “ a|B1{2 “ 1s ď eǫ ¨ PrrDCDP “ a|B1{2 “ 0s ` negpκq.
[\
As mentioned in the beginning of this section, we consider a mechanism
preserving ǫ-DP given some eventGood. Therefore, also Theorem 8 applies to this
mechanism given Good. Accordingly, the mechanism unconditionally preserves
pǫ, δq-CDP, where δ is a bound on the probability that Good does not happen.
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5 A Weak PRF for CDP based on DLWE
We are ready to show how Theorem 2 contributes to build a prospective post-
quantum secure PSA scheme for differentially private data analyses with a rel-
atively high accuracy. Concretely, we can build a secure PSA scheme from the
DLWE assumption with errors sampled according to the symmetric Skellam
distribution. These errors automatically provide enough noise to preserve DP.
5.1 The Skellam Mechanism for Differential Privacy
In this section we recall the geometric mechanism from [18] and the binomial
mechanism from [16] and introduce the Skellam mechanism. Since these mech-
anisms make use of a discrete probability distribution, they are well-suited for
an execution through a secure PSA scheme, thereby preserving CDP as shown
in the last section.
Definition 8 (Symmetric Skellam Distribution [34]) Let µ ą 0. A dis-
crete random variable X is drawn according to the symmetric Skellam distribu-
tion with parameter µ (short: X Ð Skpµq) if its probability distribution function
ψµ : Z ÞÑ R is ψµpkq “ e´µIkpµq, where Ik is the modified Bessel function of the
first kind (see [1]).
A random variable X Ð Skpµq can be generated as the difference of two
Poisson variables with mean µ, (see [34]) and is therefore efficiently samplable.
We use the fact that the sum of independent Skellam random variables is a
Skellam random variable.
Lemma 9 (Reproducibility of Skpµq [34]) Let X Ð Skpµ1q and Y Ð Skpµ2q
be independent random variables. Then Z :“ X ` Y is distributed according to
Skpµ1 ` µ2q.
An induction step shows that the sum of n i.i.d. symmetric Skellam variables
with variance µ is a symmetric Skellam variable with variance nµ. The proofs
of the following two Theorems are based on standard concentration inequalities
and are provided in Section A of the appendix.
Theorem 10 (Skellam Mechanism) Let ǫ ą 0. For every database D P Dn
and query f with sensitivity Spfq the randomised mechanism ApDq :“ fpDq`Y
preserves pǫ, δq-DP, if Y Ð Skpµq with
µ “ logp1{δq ` ǫ
1´ coshpǫ{Spfqq ` pǫ{Spfqq ¨ sinhpǫ{Spfqq .
Remark 1 The bound on µ from Theorem 10 is smaller than 2 ¨ pSpfq{ǫq2 ¨
plogp1{δq ` ǫq, thus for the standard deviation ?µ of Y Ð Skpµq it holds that?
µ “ OpSpfq ¨
a
logp1{δq{ǫq.
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Executing this mechanism through a PSA scheme requires the use of the
known constant γ which denotes the a priori estimate of the lower bound on the
fraction of uncompromised users. For this case, we provide the accuracy bound
for the Skellam mechanism.
Theorem 11 (Accuracy of the Skellam Mechanism) Let ǫ ą 0, 0 ă δ ă
1, Spfq ą 0 and let 0 ă γ ă 1 be the a priori estimate of the lower bound on the
fraction of uncompromised users in the network. By distributing the execution
of a perturbation mechanism as described above and using the parameters from
Theorem 10, we obtain pα, βq-accuracy with
α “ Spfq
ǫ
¨
ˆ
1
γ
¨
ˆ
log
ˆ
1
δ
˙
` ǫ
˙
` log
ˆ
2
β
˙˙
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Fig. 1. Empirical error of the geometric, Skellam and binomial mechanisms. The fixed
parameters are ǫ “ 0.1, Spfq “ 1, n “ 1000. The plot on the left shows the mean of
the error in absolute value for variable δ and γ “ 1 over 1000 repeats, the plot on the
right is for variable γ and δ “ 10´5.
Theorem 11 shows that for constant δ, β, γ the error of the Skellam mech-
anism is bounded by OpSpfq{ǫq. This is the same bound as for the geomet-
ric mechanism (see Theorem 3 in [33]) and the binomial mechanism from [16].
Therefore, the Skellam mechanism has the same accuracy as known solutions. In
Figure 1, an empirical comparison between the mechanisms shows that the error
of the geometric and the Skellam mechanisms have a very similar behaviour for
both variables δ and γ, while the error of the binomial mechanism is roughly
three times larger.
On the other hand, as pointed out in Section 2.1, the execution of the geometric
mechanism through a PSA scheme requires each user to generate full noise with
a small probability. Complementary, the Skellam mechanism allows all users to
simply generate noise of small variance. This fact makes the Skellam mechanism
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tremendously advantageous over the geometric mechanism, since it permits to
construct a PSA scheme based on the DLWE problem, which automatically
preserves CDP without any loss in the accuracy compared to state-of-the-art
solutions.
5.2 Hardness of the LWE problem with Errors following the
symmetric Skellam distribution
For constructing a secure PSA scheme, we consider the following λ-bounded
(Decisional) Learning with Errors problem and prove the subsequent result.
Definition 9 (λ-bounded LWE) Let κ be a security parameter, let λ “ λpκq “
polypκq and q “ qpκq ě 2 be integers and let χ be a distribution on Zq. Let
x Ð UpZκq q, let A Ð UpZλˆκq q and let e Ð χλ. The goal of the LWEpκ, λ, q, χq
problem is, given pA,Ax`eq, to find x. The goal of the DLWEpκ, λ, q, χq problem
is, given pA,yq, to decide whether y “ Ax` e or y “ u with uÐ UpZλq q.
Theorem 12 (LWE with Skellam-distributed errors) Let κ be a security
parameter and let λ “ λpκq “ polypκq with λ ą 3κ. Let q “ qpκq “ polypκq
be a sufficiently large prime modulus and ρ ą 0 such that ρq ě 4λ?κs. If
there exists a ppt algorithm that solves the LWEpκ, λ, q, Skppρqq2{4qq problem
with more than negligible probability, then there exists an efficient quantum-
algorithm that approximates the decisional shortest vector problem (GapSVP)
and the shortest independent vectors problem (SIVP) to within O˜pλκ{ρq in the
worst case.
Based on the same assumptions, the decisional problem DLWEpκ, λ, q,
Skppρqq2{4qq is also hard due to the search-to-decision reduction from [27].
Basic notions and facts about the LWE problem can be found in Section B of the
appendix. As mentioned in the introduction, our proof uses ideas by Do¨ttling
and Mu¨ller-Quade [14]. Similarly to their work, we construct a lossy code for
the symmetric Skellam distribution from the LWE problem where the errors are
taken from the discrete Gaussian distribution Dpνq with parameter ν. Variants
of lossy codes were first used in [30] and since then had applications in different
hardness reductions, such as the reduction from the LWE problem to the Learn-
ing with Rounding problem from [3]. Lossy codes are pseudo-random codes such
that the encoding of a message with the addition of certain errors obliterates
any information about the message. On the other hand, encoding the same mes-
sage using a truly random code and adding the same type of error preserves
the message. We will conclude that recovering the message when encoding it
with a random code and adding Skellam noise must be computationally hard. If
this was not the case, lossy codes could be efficiently distinguished from random
codes, contradicting the pseudo-randomness-property of lossy codes.7
7 Independently of [14], Bai et al. [5] provide an alternative way to prove the hardness
of the LWE problem with error distribution χ. They prove that it is sufficient to
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Since the Skellam distribution is both reproducible and well-suited for preserv-
ing differential privacy (see Theorem 10), the error terms in our DLWE-based
PSA scheme are used for two tasks: establishing the cryptographic security of
the scheme and the distributed noise generation to preserve differential privacy.
As observed in [14], considering a λ-bounded LWE problem, where the adver-
sary is given λpκq “ polypκq samples, poses no restrictions to most cryptographic
applications of the LWE problem, since they require only an a priori fixed num-
ber of samples. In our application to differential privacy, we identify λ with the
number of queries in a pre-defined time-series.
Entropy and Lossy Codes. We introduce the conditional min-entropy as starting
point for our technical tools. It can be seen as a measure of ambiguity.
Definition 10 (Conditional min-entropy [14]) Let χ be a probability distri-
bution with finite support Supppχq and let X, X˜ Ð χ. Let f, g be two (possibly
randomised) maps on the domain Supppχq. The pf, gq-conditional min-entropy
H8pX | fpXq “ gpX˜qq of X is defined as
H8pX | fpXq “ gpX˜qq “ ´ log2
ˆ
max
ξPSupppχq
tPrrX “ ξ | fpXq “ gpX˜qsu
˙
.
In the remainder of the work we consider f “ fA,e and g “ gA,e as maps to
the set of LWE instances, i.e.
fA,epyq “ gA,epyq “ Ay` e.
In this work, we consider the pfA,e, fA,e˜q-conditional min-entropy
H8px | fA,epxq “ fA,e˜px˜qq “ ´ log2
ˆ
max
ξPZκq
"
Pr
px,eq
rx “ ξ |Ax` e “ Ax˜` e˜s
*˙
of a random variable x, i.e. the min-entropy of x given that a LWE instance gen-
erated with pA,x, eq is equal to another LWE instance generated with pA, x˜, e˜q.
Now we provide the notion of lossy codes, which is the main technical tool used
in the proof of the hardness result.
Definition 11 (Families of Lossy Codes [14]) Let κ be a security parame-
ter, let λ “ λpκq “ polypκq and let q “ qpκq ě 2 be a modulus, ∆ “ ∆pκq and
let χ be a distribution on Zq. Let tCκ,λ,qu be a family of distributions, where
Cκ,λ,q is defined on Z
λˆκ
q . The distribution family tCκ,λ,qu is ∆-lossy for the
error distribution χ, if the following hold:
1. Cκ,λ,q is pseudo-random: It holds that Cκ,λ,q «c UpZλˆκq q.
show that the Re´nyi divergence between the smoothed distribution χ ` Dpνq and
χ is sufficiently small (where Dpνq is the discrete Gaussian with parameter ν, such
that the corresponding LWE problem is hard). They realise this proof technique
for the uniform error distribution χ “ U . However, the realisation for the Skellam
distribution is technically non-trivial.
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2. Cκ,λ,q is lossy: Let fB,bpyq “ By ` b. Let AÐ Cκ,λ,q, x˜Ð UpZκq q, e˜Ð χλ,
let xÐ UpZκq q and eÐ χλ. Then it holds that
Pr
pA,x˜,e˜q
rH8px | fA,epxq “ fA,e˜px˜qq ě ∆s ě 1´ negpκq.
3. UpZλˆκq q is non-lossy: Let fB,bpyq “ By ` b. Let A Ð UpZλˆκq q,
x˜Ð UpZκq q, e˜Ð χλ, let xÐ UpZκq q and eÐ χλ. Then it holds that
Pr
pA,x˜,e˜q
rH8px | fA,epxq “ fA,e˜px˜qq “ 0s ě 1´ negpκq.
It is not hard to see that the map-conditional entropy suffices for showing
that the existence of a lossy code for the error distribution χ implies the hardness
of the LWE problem with error distribution χ.
Theorem 13 (Lossy code gives hard LWE [14]) Let κ be a security param-
eter, let λ “ λpκq “ polypκq and let q “ qpκq be a modulus. Let the distribu-
tion χ on Zq be efficiently samplable. Let ∆ “ ∆pκq “ ωplogpκqq. Then the
LWEpκ, λ, q, χq problem is hard, given that there exists a family tCκ,λ,qu Ď Zλˆκq
of ∆-lossy codes for the error distribution χ.
Thus, for our purposes it suffices to show the existence of a lossy code for
the error distribution Skpµq. First, it is easy to show that UpZλˆκq q is always
non-lossy if the corresponding error distribution χ can be bounded, thus the
third property of Definition 11 is satisfied.
Lemma 14 (Non-lossiness of UpZλˆκq q [14]) Let κ be a security parameter
and χ a probability distribution on Z. Assume the support of χ can be bounded
by r “ rpκq “ polypκq. Moreover, let q ą p4r ` 1q1`τ for a constant τ ą 0
and λ “ λpκq ą p1 ` 2{τqκ. Let fB,bpyq “ By ` b. Let A Ð UpZλˆκq q, x˜ Ð
UpZκq q, e˜Ð χλ, let xÐ UpZκq q and eÐ χλ. Then
Pr
pA,x˜,e˜q
rHfA,e,fA,e˜,x˜pxq “ 0s ě 1´ negpκq.
For the first and the second properties we construct a lossy code for the
Skellam distribution as follows. It is essentially the same construction that was
used for the uniform error distribution in [14].
Construction 1 (Lossy code for the symmetric Skellam distribution)
Let κ be an even security parameter, let λ “ λpκq “ polypκq, ν ą 0 and let
q “ qpκq be a prime modulus. The distribution Cκ,λ,q,ν defined on Zλˆκq is speci-
fied as follows. Choose A1 Ð UpZλˆκ{2q q, TÐ UpZκ{2ˆκ{2q q and GÐ Dpνqλˆκ{2.
Output
A “ pA1||pA1T`Gqq.
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From the matrix version of the LWE problem and the search-to-decision re-
duction from [27] (see our Theorem 26), it is straightforward to see that Cκ,λ,q,ν
is pseudo-random in the sense of Property 1 of Definition 11 assuming the hard-
ness of the LWEpκ, λ, q,Dpνqq problem.
It remains to show that Construction 1 satisfies Property 2 of Definition 11. We
first state three supporting claims, whose simple proofs are provided in Section B
of the appendix. Let A “ pA1||A1T`Gq be the code as defined in Construction
1. In our further analysis we can consider only G instead of A.
Lemma 15 Let κ be an even integer, A “ pA1||pA1T`Gqq with A1 P Zλˆκ{2q ,
T P Zκ{2ˆκ{2q , G P Zλˆκ{2q . For all x P Zκ{2q there is a x1 P Zκq with Ax1 “Gx.
Lemma 16 ´C `?C2 ` 1 ě expp´Cq for all C ě 0.
Lemma 17 Let κ be a security parameter, let s “ spκq “ ωplogpκqq and let
ν “ νpκq “ polypκq. Let λ “ λpκq “ polypκq, 0 ă ζ “ ζpκq “ polypκq be integers.
Let GÐ Dpνqλˆζ . Then for all z P t0, 1uζ the following hold:
1. Prr||Gz||8 ą ζ
?
νs ď negpκq, where || ¨ ||8 is the supremum norm.
2. Prr||Gz||22 ą λζ2νs ď negpκq, where || ¨ ||2 is the Euclidean norm.
Lemma 18 Let κ be an even security parameter and A P Zλˆκq . Let s “
spκq “ ωplogpκqq, let µ “ µpκq, let q “ polypκq be a sufficiently large prime
modulus and let λ “ λpκq “ polypκq be even. Let e, e˜ Ð Skpµqλ and let ξ˜ “
argmaxξPZκq tPrere “ Aξ ` e˜su. Let u “ Aξ˜` e˜. Then ||u||1 ď λs
?
µ with prob-
ability 1´ negpκq.
We now show the lossiness of Construction 1 for the error distribution Skpµq.
Lemma 19 (Lossiness of Construction 1) Let κ be an even security param-
eter, s “ spκq “ ωplogpκqq, let ν “ νpκq, let q “ polypκq be a sufficiently large
prime modulus, let λ “ λpκq “ polypκq and let ∆ “ ∆pκq “ ωplogpκqq. Let
µ “ µpκq ě 4λ2νs2. Let fB,bpyq “ By ` b. Let AÐ tCκ,λ,q,νu for tCκ,λ,q,νu as
in Construction 1, x˜Ð UpZκq q, e˜Ð Skpµqλ, xÐ UpZκq q and eÐ Skpµqλ. Then
Pr
pA,x˜,e˜q
rH8px | fA,epxq “ fA,e˜px˜qq ě ∆s ě 1´ negpκq.
Proof. Let pMzqj denote the jth entry ofMz for a matrixM and a vector z. Let
A “ pA1||pA1T`Gqq be distributed according to Cκ,λ,q,ν with A1 Ð UpZλˆκ{2q q,
T Ð UpZκ{2ˆκ{2q q and G Ð Dpνqλˆκ{2. Let e˜ “ pe˜jqj“1,...,λ Ð Skpµqλ and
let ξ˜ “ argmaxξPZκq tPrere “ Aξ ` e˜su. Then we have the following chain of
(in)equations:
Pr
pA,x˜,e˜q
rH8px | fA,epxq “ fA,e˜px˜qq ě ∆s
“ Pr
pA,x˜,e˜q
„
max
ξPZκq
"
Pr
px,eq
rx “ ξ |Ax` e “ Ax˜` e˜s
*
ď 2´∆

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“ Pr
pA,x˜,e˜q
„
max
ξPZκq
"
Pr
px,eq
rAx` e “ Ax˜` e˜ |x “ ξs Prxrx “ ξs
Prpx,eqrAx` e “ Ax˜` e˜s
*
ď 2´∆‰ (7)
“ Pr
pA,x˜,e˜q
„
max
ξPZκq
"
Pr
px,eq
rAx` e “ Ax˜` e˜ |x “ ξs¨
¨ Prxrx “ ξsř
zPZκq Prpx,eqrAx` e “ Ax˜` e˜ |x “ zs ¨ Prxrx “ zs
+
ď 2´∆
ff
“ Pr
pA,x˜,e˜q
„
max
ξPZκq
!
Pr
e
re “ Apx˜ ´ ξq ` e˜s¨
¨ Prxrx “ ξsř
zPZκq Prere “ Apx˜´ zq ` e˜s ¨ Prxrx “ zs
+
ď 2´∆
ff
“ Pr
pA,x˜,e˜q
„
max
ξPZκq
!
Pr
e
re “ Apx˜ ´ ξq ` e˜s¨
¨ 1ř
zPZκq Prere “ Apx˜´ zq ` e˜s
+
ď 2´∆
ff
(8)
“ Pr
pA,x˜,e˜q
«
max
ξPZκq
#
Pr
e
re “ Aξ ` e˜s ¨ 1ř
zPZκq Prere “ Apx˜ ´ zq ` e˜s
+
ď 2´∆
ff
(9)
“ Pr
pA,e˜q
«
max
ξPZκq
#
Prere “ Aξ ` e˜sř
zPZκq Prere “ Az` e˜s
+
ď 2´∆
ff
(10)
“ Pr
pA,e˜q
«
min
ξPZκq
#ř
zPZκq Prere “ Az` e˜s
Prere “ Aξ ` e˜s
+
ą 2∆
ff
“ Pr
pA,e˜q
«ř
zPZκq Prere “ Az` e˜s
Prere “ Aξ˜ ` e˜s
ą 2∆
ff
(11)
“ Pr
pA,e˜q
»– ÿ
zPZκq
Prere “ Apz` ξ˜q ` e˜s
Prere “ Aξ˜ ` e˜s
ą 2∆
fifl (12)
“ Pr
pA,e˜q
»– ÿ
zPZκq
śλ
j“1 expp´µq ¨ IpApz`ξ˜qqj`e˜j pµqśλ
j“1 expp´µq ¨ IpAξ˜qj`e˜j pµq
ą 2∆
fifl
“ Pr
pA,e˜q
»– ÿ
zPZκq
λź
j“1
IpApz`ξ˜qqj`e˜j pµq
IpAξ˜qj`e˜j pµq
ą 2∆
fifl
ě Pr
pA,e˜q
»– ÿ
zPZκq
λź
j“1
pApz`ξ˜qqj`e˜jź
k“1`pAξ˜qj`e˜j
´k `
a
k2 ` µ2
µ
ą 2∆
fifl (13)
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ě Pr
pA,e˜q
»—– ÿ
zPZκq
λź
j“1
¨˝
´ppApz` ξ˜qqj ` e˜jq
µ
`
dˆ pApz` ξ˜qqj ` e˜j
µ
˙2
` 1‚˛pAzqj
ą 2∆‰ (14)
ě Pr
pA,e˜q
»– ÿ
zPZκq
λź
j“1
exp
ˆ
´pApz ` ξ˜qqj ` e˜j
µ
˙pAzqj
ą 2∆
fifl (15)
“ Pr
pA,e˜q
»– ÿ
zPZκq
λź
j“1
exp
˜
´pAzq
2
j ` pAξ˜qj ¨ pAzqj ` e˜j ¨ pAzqj
µ
¸
ą 2∆
fifl
“ Pr
pA,e˜q
»– ÿ
zPZκq
λź
j“1
exp
˜
´pAzq
2
j ` pAzqj ¨ ppAξ˜qj ` e˜jq
µ
¸
ą 2∆
fifl
ě Pr
pA,e˜q
»– ÿ
zPZκq
exp
ˆ
´||Az||
2
2 ` ||Az||8 ¨ ||Aξ˜ ` e˜||1
µ
˙
ą 2∆
fifl (16)
ěPr
A
»– ÿ
zPZκq
exp
ˆ
´||Az||
2
2 ` ||Az||8 ¨ λs
?
µ
µ
˙
ą 2∆
fifl´ negpκq (17)
ěPr
G
»– ÿ
zPZκ{2q
exp
ˆ
´||Gz||
2
2 ` ||Gz||8 ¨ λs
?
µ
µ
˙
ą 2∆
fifl´ negpκq. (18)
Equation (7) is an application of the Bayes rule and Equation (8) applies,
since x is sampled according to a uniform distribution. Equation (9) applies,
since maximising over ξ is the same as maximising over x˜´ ξ. Equation (10) is
valid since in the denominator we are summing over all possible z P Zκq . Equation
(11) holds by definition of ξ˜. Equation (12) is an index shift by ξ˜. Inequation
(13) follows from essential properties of the modified Bessel functions (iterative
application of Lemma 20). Note that the modified Bessel function of the first
kind is symmetric when considered over integer orders. Therefore, from this point
of the chain of (in)equations (i.e. from Inequation (13)), we can assume that
e˜j ě 0. Moreover, we can assume that pAzqj ě 0, since otherwise IpAzqj`e˜j pµq ą
I´pAzqj`e˜j pµq. I.e. if pAzqj ă 0, then we implicitly change the sign of the jth
row in the original matrix A while considering the particular z. In this way, we
are always considering the worst-case scenario for every z. Note that this step
does not change the distribution of A, since tCκ,λ,q,νu is symmetric. Inequation
(14) holds, since fµpkq “ p´k `
a
k2 ` µ2q{µ is a monotonically decreasing
function. Inequation (15) follows from Lemma 16 by setting C “ ppAzqj` e˜jq{µ.
Inequation (16) holds because of the Ho¨lder’s inequality. Inequation (17) follows
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from Lemma 18. Inequation (18) follows from Lemma 15, since
A “ pA1||pA1T`Gqq.
Now consider the set Z “ t0, 1uκ{2. Then |Z| “ 2κ{2. Since µ ě 4λ2νs2, from
Lemma 17, it follows that
Pr
pG,e˜q
«ÿ
zPZ
exp
ˆ
´||Gz||
2
2 ` ||Gz||8 ¨ λs
?
µ||1
µ
˙
ě 2κ{2 ¨ exp
´
´κ
4
´ κ
16s2
¯ff
ě1´ negpκq,
where the norm is computed in the central residue-class representation of the
elements in Zq. Moreover we have
2κ{2 ¨ exp
´
´κ
4
´ κ
16s2
¯
ą Cκ
for some constant C ą 1. Therefore
Pr
pA,x˜,e˜q
rH8px | fA,epxq “ fA,e˜px˜qq ě ∆s
ě Pr
G
«ÿ
zPZ
exp
ˆ
´||Gz||
2
2 ` ||Gz||8 ¨ λs
?
µ
µ
˙
ą 2∆
ff
´ negpκq
ě 1´ negpκq ´ negpκq
“ 1´ negpκq.
[\
Putting the previous results together, we finally show the hardness of the LWE
problem with errors drawn from the symmetric Skellam distribution.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 12). By Theorem 25, the LWEpκ, λ, q,Dpνqq problem
is hard for ν “ pαqq2{p2πq ą 2κ{π, if there exists no efficient quantum algorithm
approximating the decisional shortest vector problem (GapSVP) and the short-
est independent vectors problem (SIVP) to within O˜pκ{αq in the worst case. Let
q “ qpκq “ polypκq, s “ spκq “ ωplogpκqq and λ ą 3κ. Then for ∆ “ ωplogpκqq,
Lemma 14, the pseudo-randomness of Construction 1 and Lemma 19 provide
that Construction 1 gives us a family of ∆-lossy codes for the symmetric Skel-
lam distribution with variance µ ě 4λ2νs2. As observed in Theorem 13, this is
sufficient for the hardness of the LWEpκ, λ, q, Skpµqq problem. Setting ρ “ 2αλs
yields pρqq2 ą 16λ2κs2 and the claim follows. [\
By the search-to-decision reduction from [27] we obtain the hardness of the
DLWE problem as a corollary.
28
5.3 A CDP-Preserving PSA scheme based on DLWE
Security of the scheme. We can build an instantiation of Theorem 2 (without
correct decryption) based on the DLWEpκ, λ, q, χq problem as follows. Set S “
M “ Zκq , G “ Zq, choose si Ð UpZκq q for all i “ 1, . . . , n and s0 “ ´
řn
i“1 si,
set Fsiptq “ xt, siy ` ei (which is a so-called randomised weak pseudo-random
function as described in [4] and in [6]), where ei Ð χ (for the uncompromised
users) and let ϕ be the identity function. Therefore
xt, siy ` ei ` di “ ci,t Ð PSAEncsipt, diq
for data value di P Zq, i “ 1, . . . , n. The decryption function is defined by
nÿ
i“1
di`
nÿ
i“1
ei “ xt, s0y`
nÿ
i“1
Fsiptq`di “ xt, s0y`
nÿ
i“1
ci,t “ PSADecs0pt, c1,t, . . . , cn,tq.
Thus, the decryption is not perfectly correct anymore, but yields a noisy aggre-
gate. Let γ P p0, 1s be the a priori known fraction of uncompromised users in the
network. Then we can construct the following DLWE-based PSA schemes.
Example 1 Let χ “ Dpν{pγnqq with parameter ν{pγnq “ 2κ{π, then the
DLWEpκ, λ, q, χq problem is hard and the above scheme is secure.
Example 2 Let χ “ Skpµ{pγnqq with variance µ{pγnq “ 4λ2κs2, where λ “
λpκq “ polypκq with λ ą 3κ, then the DLWEpκ, λ, q, χq problem is hard and the
above scheme is secure.
Remark 2 The original result from [32] states that the LWE problem is hard in
the set T “ R{Z when the noise is distributed according to the continuous Gaus-
sian distribution (with a certain bound on the variance) modulo 1. Although the
continuous Gaussian distribution is reproducible as well, it does not seem to
fit well for a DLWE-based PSA scheme: For data processing reasons the val-
ues would have to be discretised. Therefore the resulting noise would follow a
distribution which is not reproducible anymore.8
Differential privacy of the mechanism. The total noise
řn
i“1 ei in Example
2 is distributed according to Skpµq due to Lemma 9. Thus, in contrast to the
total noise in Example 1, the total noise in Example 2 preserves the distribution
of the single noise and can be used for preserving differential privacy of the
correct sum by splitting the task of perturbation among the users.
8 In [9] it was shown that the sum of n discrete Gaussians each with parameter σ2 is
statistically close to a discrete Gaussian with parameter ν “ nσ2 if σ ą ?nηεpΛq for
some smoothing parameter ηεpΛq of the underlying lattice Λ. However, this approach
is less suitable for our purpose if the number of users is large, since the aggregated
decryption outcome would have a an error with a variance of order ν “ Ωpn2q (in
example 2 the variance is only of order Opλ2κnq).
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Suppose that adding symmetric Skellam noise with variance µ preserves pǫ, δq-
DP. We define µuser “ µ{pγnq. Since the Skellam distribution is reproducible, the
noise addition can be executed in a distributed manner: each (uncompromised)
user simply adds (independent) symmetric Skellam noise with variance µuser to
her own value in order to preserve the privacy of the final output.
Accuracy of the mechanism. From Theorem 11 we know that the error of
the Skellam mechanism executed in a distributed manner among γn uncompro-
mised users does not exceed OpSpfq ¨ logp1{δq{ǫq with high probability. Theorem
2 indicates that the set T contains all the time-frames where a query can be
executed. We identify |T | “ λ, i.e. the number of queries is equal to the number
of equations in the instance LWE problem.9 Due to sequential composition10, in
order to preserve pǫ, δq-DP for all λ queries together, the executed mechanism
must preserve pǫ{λ, δq-DP for each query. Therefore the following holds: suppose
Skpµ1q-noise is sufficient in order to preserve pǫ, δq-DP for a single query. Then,
due to Remark 1, we must use Skpλ2µ1q-noise in order to preserve pǫ, δq-DP for
all λ queries. By Theorem 11 the error in each query within T is bounded by
OpλSpfq ¨ logp1{δq{ǫq which is consistent with the effects of sequential composi-
tion.
Combining Security, Privacy and Accuracy. Let Spfq “ λw (i.e. f is the
statistical analysis over the whole time-period T ) and at any time j P rλs, let the
data of each user come from t´w{2, . . . , w{2u. For µ “ 2 ¨ pλw{ǫq2 ¨ plogp1{δq` ǫq,
it follows from the previous discussion and Remark 1 that if every user adds
Skpµ{pγnqq-noise to her data for every j “ 1, . . . , λ, then this suffices to preserve
pǫ, δq-DP for all λ sum-queries executed during T .
Furthermore, if for a security parameter κ we have that µ{pγnq “ 4λ2κs2, then
we obtain a secure protocol for sum-queries, where the security is based on
prospectively hard lattice problems. As we showed in Section 4.2, a combination
of these two results provides pǫ, δq-CDP for all λ sum-queries.
Corollary 1 Let δ ą 0. For all j “ 1, . . . , λ, the PSA scheme from Example 2
preserves pǫ, δq-CDP, where for the largest possible11 ǫ “ ǫpκq, it holds thatd
w2 ¨ logp1{δq
2γnκs2
ď ǫ ď
d
w2 ¨ logp1{δq
2γnκs2
` w
2
2γnκs2
.
Proof. Assume that for µ “ 4γnλ2κs2, every uncorrupted user in the network
adds Skpµ{pγnqq-noise to her data for each of the λ queries in order to securely
encrypt it using the scheme from Example 2. Then there exist ǫ, δ such that the
9 A result from [36] indicates that for an efficient and accurate mechanism this number
cannot be substantially larger than n2.
10 See for instance Theorem 3 in [26].
11 Of course it is always possible to decrease ǫ by simply using a larger magnitude for
the noise parameter.
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decryption output preserves pǫ, δq-CDP for all λ queries. In order to calculate ǫ,
we set
2 ¨ pwλ{ǫq2 ¨ plogp1{δq ` ǫq “ 4γnλ2κs2.
Solving for ǫ, we obtain
ǫ “ w
2 `aw4 ` 8w2 ¨ logp1{δq ¨ γnκs2
4γnκs2
.
This expression is smaller than
w2
4γnκs2
` w
2
4γnκs2
`
a
8w2 ¨ logp1{δq ¨ γnκs2
4γnκs2
and larger than a
8w2 ¨ logp1{δq ¨ γnκs2
4γnκs2
.
This indicates that ǫ “ ǫpκq depends on 1{κ. Note that this is consistent with
the original definition of CDP from [28]. Thus, in addition to a privacy/accuracy
trade-off there is also a security/accuracy trade-off. More specifically, depending
on κ and n we obtain an upper bound on the minimal pα, βq-accuracy for every
single query executed during T :
α “ λw
ǫ
¨
ˆ
1
γ
¨
ˆ
log
ˆ
1
δ
˙
` ǫ
˙
` log
ˆ
2
β
˙˙
ď λ ¨
d
2γnκs2
logp1{δq ¨
ˆ
1
γ
¨ log
ˆ
1
δ
˙
` log
ˆ
2
β
˙˙
` λw
γ
“ Opλs?κ ¨ n` λwq.
Finally, we are able to prove our main result, Theorem 1, which follows from
the preceding analyses.
Proof (of Theorem 1). The claim follows from Theorem 8 together with Theorem
2 (instantiated with the efficient constructions in Example 2) and from Theorem
10 together with Theorem 11. [\
6 Conclusions
In this work we continued a line of research opened by the work of Shi et al. [33].
Using the notion of computational differential privacy, we provided a connection
between a secure PSA scheme and a mechanism preserving differential privacy by
showing a composition theorem saying that a differentially private mechanism
preserves CDP if it is executed through a secure PSA scheme. This closes a
security reduction chain from key-homomorphic weak PRFs to CDP, which was
initiated in [37]. After introducing the Skellam mechanism for differential privacy
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we constructed the first prospective post-quantum PSA scheme for analyses of
large data amounts from large amounts of individuals under differential privacy.
The theoretic basis of the scheme is the DLWE assumption with Skellam noise
that is used both for security of the scheme and for preserving computational
differential privacy.
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A The Skellam mechanism
A.1 Preliminaries
As observed before, the distributed noise generation is feasible with a probability
distribution function closed under convolution. For this purpose, we recall the
Skellam distribution.
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Definition 12 (Skellam Distribution [34]) Let µ1, µ2 ą 0. A discrete ran-
dom variable X is drawn according to the Skellam distribution with parameters
µ1, µ2 (short: X Ð Skpµ1, µ2q) if it has the following probability distribution
function ψµ1,µ2 : Z ÞÑ R:
ψµ1,µ2pkq “ e´pµ1`µ2q
ˆ
µ1
µ2
˙k{2
Ikp2?µ1µ2q,
where Ik is the modified Bessel function of the first kind (see pages 374–378 in
[1]).
A random variableX Ð Skpµ1, µ2q has variance µ1`µ2 and can be generated
as the difference of two random variables drawn according to the Poisson distri-
bution of mean µ1 and µ2, respectively (see [34]). Note that the Skellam distribu-
tion is not generally symmetric. However, we mainly consider the particular case
µ1 “ µ2 “ µ{2 and refer to this symmetric distribution as Skpµq “ Skpµ{2, µ{2q.
Suppose that adding symmetric Skellam noise with variance µ preserves pǫ, δq-
DP. Recall that the network is given an a priori known estimate γ of the lower
bound on the fraction of uncompromised users. We define µuser “ µ{pγnq and
instruct the users to add symmetric Skellam noise with variance µuser to their
own data. If compromised users will not add noise, the total noise will be still
sufficient to preserve pǫ, δq-DP by Lemma 9.
For our analysis, we use the following bound on the ratio of modified Bessel
functions of the first kind.
Lemma 20 (Bound on Ikpµq [23]) For real k, let Ikpµq be the modified Bessel
function of the first kind and order k. Then
1 ą Ikpµq
Ik´1pµq ą
´k `
a
k2 ` µ2
µ
, k ě 0.
Moreover, we will use the Tura´n-type inequality on the modified Bessel func-
tions from [35].
Lemma 21 (Tura´n-type inequality [35]) For k ą ´1{2, let Ikpµq be the
modified Bessel function of the first kind and order k. Then for all µ ą 0:
Ikpµq2 ą Ik´1pµq ¨ Ik`1pµq.
For the privacy analysis of the Skellam mechanism, we need a tail bound on
the symmetric Skellam distribution.
Lemma 22 (Tail bound on the Skellam distribution) Let X Ð Skpµq and
let σ ą 0. Then, for all τ ě ´σµ,
PrrX ą σµ` τ s ď e´µp1´
?
1`σ2`σ lnpσ`?1`σ2qq´τ lnpσ`?1`σ2q.
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Proof. We use standard techniques from probability theory. Applying Markov’s
inequality, for any t ą 0,
PrrX ą σµ` τ s “ PrretX ą etpσµ`τqs
ď Ere
tXs
etpσµ`τq
.
As shown in [21], for X Ð Skpµq, the moment generating function of X is
EretXs “ e´µp1´coshptqq,
where coshptq “ pet ` e´tq{2. Hence, we have
PrrX ą σµ` τ s ď e´µp1´coshptq`tσq´tτ .
Fix t “ lnpσ ` ?1` σ2q. In order to conclude the proof, we observe that
coshplnpσ `?1` σ2qq “ ?1` σ2. [\
One can easily verify that, for σ ą 0,
1´
a
1` σ2 ` σ lnpσ `
a
1` σ2q ą 0.
A.2 Analysis of the Skellam mechanism
In this section, we prove the bound on the variance µ of the symmetric Skellam
distribution as stated in Theorem 10 that is needed in order to preserve pǫ, δq-
differential privacy and we compute the error that is thus produced.
Privacy analysis.
Proof (of Theorem 10). Let D0, D1 P Dn be adjacent databases with |fpD0q ´
fpD1q| ď Spfq. The largest ratio between PrrASkpD0q “ Rs and PrrASkpD1q “
Rs is reached when k :“ R ´ fpD0q “ R ´ fpD1q ´ Spfq ě 0, where R is any
possible output of ASk. Then, by Lemma 20, for all possible outputs R of ASk:
PrrASkpD0q “ Rs
PrrASkpD1q “ Rs “
PrrY “ ks
PrrY “ k ` Spfqs
“
Spfqź
j“1
PrrY “ k ` j ´ 1s
PrrY “ k ` js
ă
Spfqź
j“1
µ
´pk ` jq `
a
pk ` jq2 ` µ2
ď eǫ. (19)
Inequality (19) holds if k ď sinhpǫ{Spfqq¨µ´Spfq, since it implies k ď sinhpǫ{Spfqq¨
µ´ j and therefore
µ
´pk ` jq `apk ` jq2 ` µ2 ď eǫ{Spfq
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for all j “ 1, . . . , Spfq. Applying Lemma 22 with σ “ sinhpǫ{Spfqq and τ “
´Spfq, we get
PrrY ą sinhpǫ{Spfqq ¨ µ´ Spfqs ď e´µ¨p1´coshpǫ{Spfqq`pǫ{Spfqq¨sinhpǫ{Spfqqq`ǫ
and this expression is set to be smaller or equal than δ. This inequality is satisfied
if
µ ě logp1{δq ` ǫ
1´ coshpǫ{Spfqq ` pǫ{Spfqq ¨ sinhpǫ{Spfqq .
[\
Accuracy analysis.
Proof (of Theorem 11). Let
µ “ logp1{δq ` ǫ
1´ coshpǫ{Spfqq ` pǫ{Spfqq ¨ sinhpǫ{Spfqq
be the bound on the variance for the Skellam mechanism provided in Theorem 10
and let the random variable Y denote the total noise induced by the mechanism.
As in the proof of Lemma 22 and since Y Ð Skpµq, for α1 ą 0,
Prr|Y | ą α1s “ 2 ¨ PrrY ą α1s
ď 2 ¨ e´µ¨p1´coshpǫ{Spfqqq´pǫ{Spfqq¨α1
and this expression is set to be equal to β. Solving this equality for α1 yields
α1 “ Spfq
ǫ
¨
ˆˆ
cosh
ˆ
ǫ
Spfq
˙
´ 1
˙
¨ µ` log
ˆ
2
β
˙˙
“ Spfq
ǫ
¨
ˆˆ
log
ˆ
1
δ
˙
` ǫ
˙
¨ coshpǫ{Spfqq ´ 1
1´ coshpǫ{Spfqq ` pǫ{Spfqq ¨ sinhpǫ{Spfqq
` log
ˆ
2
β
˙˙
ď Spfq
ǫ
¨
ˆ
log
ˆ
1
δ
˙
` ǫ` log
ˆ
2
β
˙˙
“ α.
[\
For the distributed noise generation, each single user adds symmetric Skellam
noise with variance µuser “ µ{pγnq to her data. The worst case for accuracy
is when all n users add noise, thus the total noise Y is a symmetric Skellam
variable with variance µ{γ and the accuracy becomes
α “ Spfq
ǫ
¨
ˆ
1
γ
¨
ˆ
log
ˆ
1
δ
˙
` ǫ
˙
` log
ˆ
2
β
˙˙
,
proving Theorem 11.
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B Additional details for Section 5.2
In this section we will provide more notions and facts about the LWE problem
and more details for the proof of Theorem 12.
B.1 Learning with Errors.
In most of the results about lattice-based cryptography the LWE problem is
considered with errors sampled according to a discrete Gaussian distribution.
Definition 13 (Discrete Gaussian distribution [32]) Let q be an integer
and let Φs denote the normal distribution with variance s
2{p2πq. Let Ψα de-
note the discretised Gaussian distribution with variance pαqq2{p2πq, i.e. Ψα is
sampled by taking a sample from Φαq and performing a randomised rounding
(see [6]). Let Dpνq be the discretised Gaussian distribution with variance ν, i.e.
Dpνq “ Ψ?2πν{q.
We consider a λ-bounded LWE problem, where the adversary is given λpκq “
polypκq samples (which we can write conveniently in matrix-form). As observed
in [14], this consideration poses no restrictions to most cryptographic applica-
tions of the LWE problem, since they require only an a priori fixed number of
samples. In our application to differential privacy (see Section 5) we identify λ
with the number of queries in a pre-defined time-series.
Problem 1. λ-bounded LWE Search Problem, Average-Case Version. Let
κ be a security parameter, let λ “ λpκq “ polypκq and q “ qpκq ě 2 be integers
and let χ be a distribution on Zq. Let x Ð UpZκq q, let A Ð UpZλˆκq q and let
eÐ χλ. The goal of the LWEpκ, λ, q, χq problem is, given pA,Ax`eq, to find x.
Problem 2. λ-bounded LWE Distinguishing Problem. Let κ be a security
parameter, let λ “ λpκq “ polypκq and q “ qpκq ě 2 be integers and let χ be a
distribution on Zq. Let xÐ UpZκq q, let AÐ UpZλˆκq q and let eÐ χλ. The goal
of the DLWEpκ, λ, q, χq problem is, given pA,yq, to decide whether y “ Ax` e
or y “ u with uÐ UpZλq q.
B.2 Basic Facts
Facts about the used Distributions. We need to find a tail bound for the
sum of discrete Gaussian variables such that the tail probability is negligible.
Lemma 23 (Bound for the L1-norm of a discrete Gaussian vector) Let
κ be a complexity parameter and let ν “ νpκq “ polypκq. Let ζ “ ζpκq “ polypκq.
Let g1, . . . , gζ Ð Dpνq be independent discrete Gaussian variables. Then
Pr
«
ζÿ
i“1
|gi| ą ζ
?
ν
ff
ď negpκq.
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Proof. Let s “ spκq “ ωplogpκqq with s2 “ opζq. Since g1, . . . , gζ are discrete
Gaussian variables, we can bound them by a continuous Gaussian variable X
with variance ν:
Prr|gi| ą
?
sνs ď Prr|X | ě ?sνs ď expp´s{2q “ negpκq
for all i “ 1, . . . ζ. The random variables |gi| are distributed according to a half-
normal distribution (see [10]) and have mean
a
2ν{π. By the Hoeffding bound
we obtain for all t ě 0:
Pr
«
ζÿ
i“1
|gi| ą t` ζ ¨
a
2ν{π
ff
ď exp
ˆ
´ 2t
2
ζ ¨ ν ¨ s
˙
with probability 1´ negpκq. Choosing t “ s?ζν yields the claim. [\
Moreover, we need a proper lower bound on the symmetric Skellam distribution
that holds with probability exponentially close to 0.
Lemma 24 (Bound on the Skellam distribution) Let κ be a security pa-
rameter, let s “ spκq “ ωplogpκqq and let µ “ µpκq “ polypκq with µ ą s ą 0.
Let X Ð Skpµq. Then
PrrX ą s?µs ď negpκq.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 22. Applying the Laplace
transform and the Markov’s inequality we obtain for any t ą 0,
PrrX ą s?µs “ PrretX ą ets?µs ď Ere
tXs
ets
?
µ
.
As for the proof of Lemma 22, we use the moment generating function of X Ð
Skpµq, which is
EretXs “ e´µp1´coshptqq,
where coshptq “ pet ` e´tq{2. Hence, we have
PrrX ą s?µs ď e´µp1´coshptqq´ts?µ ă e´sp1´coshptqq´ts3{2 .
Fix t “ arsinhp1{?sq. Then
PrrX ą s?µs ăe´sp1´
?
1`1{sq´s3{2 arsinhp1{?sq
“e´s ¨ es¨p
?
1`1{s´?s arsinhp1{?sqq
ăe´s ¨ e2{3
“negpκq.
To see the last inequality, observe that the function
fpsq “ s ¨ p
a
1` 1{s´?s arsinhp1{?sqq
is monotonically increasing and its limit is 2{3. [\
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Facts about Learning with Errors. Regev [32] established worst-to-average
case connections between conjecturally hard lattice problems and the
LWEpκ, λ, q,Dpνqq problem.
Theorem 25 (Worst-to-Average Case [32]) Let κ be a security parameter
and let q “ qpκq be a modulus, let α “ αpκq P p0, 1q be such that αq ą 2?κ. If
there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm solving the
LWEpκ, λ, q,Dppαqq2{p2πqqq problem with non-negligible probability, then there
exists an efficient quantum algorithm that approximates the decisional shortest
vector problem (GAPSVP) and the shortest independent vectors problem (SIVP)
to within O˜pκ{αq in the worst case.
We use the search-to-decision reduction from [27] basing the hardness of
Problem 2 on the hardness of Problem 1 which works for any error distribution
χ and is sample preserving.
Theorem 26 (Search-to-Decision [27]) Let κ be a security parameter, q “
qpκq “ polypκq a prime modulus and let χ be any distribution on Zq. As-
sume there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time distinguisher that solves the
DLWEpκ, λ, q, χq problem with non-negligible success-probability, then there ex-
ists a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary that solves the LWEpκ, λ, q, χq
problem with non-negligible success-probability.
Finally, we provide a matrix version of Problem 2. The hardness of this
version can be shown by using a hybrid argument as pointed out in [14].
Lemma 27 (Matrix version of LWE) Let κ be a security parameter, λ “
λpκq “ polypκq, κ1 “ κ1pκq “ polypκq. Assume that the DLWEpκ, λ, q, χq prob-
lem is hard. Then pA,AX ` Eq is pseudo-random, where A Ð UpZλˆκq q,X Ð
UpZκˆκ1q q and EÐ χλˆκ
1
.
Facts about Lossy Codes. We will use the fact that the existence of a lossy
code (Definition 11) for an error distribution implies the hardness of the associ-
ated decoding problems. This means that solving the LWE problem is hard even
though with overwhelming probability the secret is information-theoretically
unique. The result was shown in [14].
Proof (of Theorem 13). Due to the non-lossiness of UpZλˆκq q for χ, instances of
LWEpκ, λ, q, χq have a unique solution with probability 1´negpκq. Now, let T be
a ppt adversary solving the LWEpκ, λ, q, χq problem with more than negligible
probability σ. Using T , we will construct a ppt distinguisher DLWE distinguishing
UpZλˆκq q and Cκ,λ,q with more than negligible advantage.
Let A P Zλˆκ be the input of DLWE. It must decide whether A Ð UpZλˆκq q or
A Ð Cκ,λ,q. Therefore, DLWE samples x˜ Ð UpZκq and e˜ Ð χλ. It runs T on
input pA,Ax˜` e˜q. Then T outputs some x P Zκ. If x “ x˜, then DLWE outputs
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1, otherwise it outputs 0.
If AÐ UpZλˆκq q, then x˜ is unique and then x “ x˜ with probability σ. Therefore
PrrDLWEpAq “ 1 |AÐ UpZλˆκq qs “ σ.
If A Ð Cκ,λ,q, then T outputs the Bayes-optimal hypothesis which will be the
correct value with probability
max
ξPZκq
tPrrx “ ξ |Ax` e “ Ax˜` e˜su “ 2´H8px | fA,epxq“fA,e˜px˜qq ď 2´∆,
with fB,bpyq “ By` b. This holds with probability 1´ negpκq over the choice
of pA, x˜, e˜q. This probability is negligible in κ, since ∆ “ ωplogpκqq. Therefore
PrrDLWEpAq “ 1 |AÐ Cκ,λ,qs “ negpκq
and in conclusion DLWE distinguishes UpZλˆκq q and Cκ,λ,q with probability at
least σ ´ negpκq, which is more than negligible. [\
B.3 Additional Proofs for the Hardness Result
We provide the proofs of the supporting Lemma 15, Lemma 16, Lemma 17 and
Lemma 18.
Proof (of Lemma 15). For all x P Zκ{2q , set x1 “ p´pTxqtr||xtrqtr. Then
Ax1 “pA1||pA1T`Gqq ¨ x1
“´A1Tx` pA1T`Gq ¨ x
“´A1Tx`A1Tx`Gx
“Gx.
[\
Proof (of Lemma 16). Let fpCq “ p´C`?C2 ` 1q exppCq. Then fpCq is mono-
tonically increasing and fp0q “ 1 ¨ p´0`?0` 1q “ 1. [\
Proof (of Lemma 17). The claims of Lemma 17 follow from Lemma 23. [\
Proof (of Lemma 18). By assumption, we have
Pr
e
re “ us “ max
ξPZκq
!
Pr
e
re “ Aξ ` e˜s
)
. (20)
Let ||u||1 “ C and u˜ “ prC{λs, rC{λs, . . . , tC{λu, tC{λuqtr, i.e. u˜ is maximally
balanced with ||u˜||1 “ C (ceiling C{λ for the first components of u˜ and flooring
for the last ones). First, we show that under all vectors with L1-norm C, the
vector u˜ has the maximal probability weight, i.e. we show that
Pr
e
re “ u˜s “ max
vPZλq s.t. ||v||1“C
!
Pr
e
re “ vs
)
. (21)
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The difference between the largest and the smallest component in u˜ is at most
1 (it is 0 iff C is a multiple of λ). Let w be any less balanced vector than u˜ with
||w||1 “ C, i.e. let the difference between the largest and the smallest component
in w be at least 2. Then there exist indices i1, i2 P rλs, such that wi2 ´wi1 ě 2.
We construct a vector w˜ with the following components:
w˜i “
$’&’%
wi ` 1 if i “ i1
wi ´ 1 if i “ i2
wi else.
Then, due to Lemma 21, we have that Prere “ w˜s ą Prere “ ws. If we iterate
this argument until we consider a maximally balanced vector (i.e. a vector with
a difference of at most 1 between its largest and its smallest component), we
obtain
Pr
e
re “ u˜s ą Pr
e
re “ ws.
This implies Equation (21).
Now assume that C ą λs?µ. Then, by the previous claim, we have that u˜j ě
ts
?
µu for each component u˜j of u˜, j “ 1, . . . , λ. Since by Lemma 24, a Skellam
variable is bounded by ts
?
µu with overwhelming probability, we have
Pr
e
re “ e˜s ą Pr
e
re “ u˜s
(21)
ě Pr
e
re “ us
with overwhelming probability over the choice of e˜, which is a contradiction to
Equation (20). [\
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